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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the presence of political budget cycles in the Portuguese 
fiscal policy at a disaggregated level. Policy makers in democracies have clear incentives to 
use economic policies to their own advantage. Therefore, the influence of electoral 
concerns and government ideology on short-term economic performance has been an 
important topic in Public Choice. Empirics has consistently shown evidence of periodical 
shifts in economic aggregates associated with political motives, although mixed results are 
found regarding the partisan or opportunistic nature of these cycles. 
This article focuses on the particular case of government spending in Portugal. We 
know that the Stability and Growth Pact constrains EU members’ fiscal policy, however 
not much else really remains to maneuver before elections and, in reality, some studies 
have found evidence that, although constrained, fiscal policy exhibits political motives. 
However, Portuguese reality is under-researched especially at the national level and 
constitutes an excellent testing ground to examine Brender and Drazen’s (2005) claim that 
political budget cycles are a phenomena of new democracies. Furthermore, in recent 
years we have witnessed a renewed interest on the understanding of fiscal policy 
determinants and outcomes, more so in the case of a country like Portugal that since the 
turn of the decade is experiencing budgetary control difficulties. 
Instead of the traditional analyses of the main aggregates related to fiscal policy, 
we want to dig deeper and investigate political motives in the composition of government 
expenditures. For such a task, we use a dataset of annual data for ten main areas of 
government spending in Portugal. 
The results presented by this study are quite interesting, providing dissimilar 
preferences over different expenditure components. Independently of its ideology, 
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governments usually choose to increase those expenditure components that have more 
visibility and impact in terms of electoral return: general public services, social protection 
and health care. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and the econometric models to be used in the 
empirical analysis. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4 and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
The seminal work of Downs (1957) emphasizes the idea that economic strategies 
are not politically harmless nor political choices are free of economic concerns. To better 
understand this relationship numerous scholars have tried to comprehend how the 
ideological preferences of governments, the electoral agenda, and the competition 
between parties affect macroeconomic variables. Two main theories emerge from the 
literature: the political business cycle approach (Nordhaus, 1975) and the partisan theory 
(Hibbs, 1977). The first assumes that politicians have no policy preferences, so they act 
"opportunistically" selecting the policies that maximize their electoral support. They 
create unusual favorable economic conditions before an election and - in order to correct 
this artificial unbalance – contractionary measures are implemented immediately after the 
elections. Alternatively, the partisan theory does not view politicians as homogenous, 
arguing that different parties have different policy objectives, behaving, when in office, in 
a partisan manner.
1
 Specifically, left-wing parties are relatively more concerned with 
                                                 
1
The partisan model generates policy effects after elections, while the opportunist model generates policy 
effects before elections. 
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unemployment (growth) than with inflation, whereas right-wing parties are especially 
worried with inflation control. 
In the 1980's and 1990´s rational versions of both theories emerged, exploring the 
assumption that voters form expectations rationally. In a context where competence and 
asymmetric information are the key elements, both rational partisan models (Alesina, 
1987; Alesina and Sachs, 1988) and rational opportunistic models (Rogoff and Sibert, 
1988; Rogoff, 1990) resulted in the reduction of policymaker's ability to induce political 
cycles. 
Empirical studies suggest that favorable economic conditions benefit governments 
(Hibbs, 2006). Partisan behavior seems to be more frequent in developed countries 
(Alesina and Roubini, 1992; Alesina et al., 1997), while opportunistic behavior appears to 
gather more support in developing countries (see, for instance, Brender and Drazen, 2009; 
Vergne, 2009; and Shi and Svensson, 2006). 
Along with the other main economic aggregates, governments’ fiscal policy has 
also been studied to check if it is governed by political as much as economic 
considerations. The extension of the traditional approaches to fiscal policy is 
straightforward: boosts in expenditures and/or revenue reductions prior to elections 
should signal opportunistic behavior, while in the partisan perspective left-wing 
governments are more prone to budget deficits than their counterparts. The actual 
modeling of political budgetary cycles came with Rogoff and Sibert’s (1988) work that 
presented a model of adverse selection underlining competence and asymmetric 
information. A further refinement made by Rogoff (1990) highlighted the need to search 
budgetary cycles inside the broad aggregates, especially in the composition of government 
spending. The model considers that the most efficient way for governments to signal 
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competence is to divert spending from capital spending to current spending thus favoring 
transfers and more visible programs. The idea is to increase those expenditures that send 
the strongest signals, consequently trading those that generate benefits over time for 
those that are noticeable immediately. 
Several studies, both at national and multi-national level, have provided evidence 
of the relationship between elections and fiscal policy manipulations. Shi and Svensson 
(2002a, b; 2006), using multi-country data, consistently capture political budget cycles and 
show that the effect is significantly stronger in less developed countries. In their latter 
article they find that, on average, fiscal deficits increases by 22% in election years. For a 
set of developed countries, Persson and Tabellini (2003) find a political revenue cycle, but 
no trace of political cycle in expenditures, budget or transfers. Focusing on EU countries 
Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) do not find a fiscal electoral cycle, Mink and de Haan (2006) 
report a budget deficit increase in electoral years and a significant but small partisan 
effect on fiscal aggregates, while Efthyvoulou (2012) concludes that governments across 
the EU tend to generate budgetary opportunistic cycles and that these are much larger in 
the Eurozone countries. Highlighting institutional features, Persson and Tabellini (2002) 
show that the form of government (presidential or parliamentary) and the electoral rules 
(proportional or majoritarian) affect the configuration of budget cycles. 
Other studies explore the expenditure components. Alesina (1988), for example, 
reports a small electoral cycle in transfers in the United States. For Canada, the results 
found by Blais and Nadeau (1992) suggest a short pre-electoral cycle observable on road 
expenditures and social services, while Potrafke (2010), focusing on direct transfer 
payments, finds that incumbents increase the growth of public health expenditures in 
election years. 
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For Portugal there is some relevant research done but restricted to the local 
governments’ political budget cycle. For example, Veiga and Veiga (2007a) report an 
increase in local governments’ total expenditures before elections and a change in their 
composition that favors items immediately visible to the electorate, namely investment 
expenditures on overpasses, streets and complementary works, and on rural roads.
2
 One 
of the main objectives of the present article is to check if this behavior of local authorities 
is also present at the national level of Portuguese governance. 
 
3. Data and econometric model 
In order to investigate potential politically-driven changes in the composition of 
expenditures, we use a panel of annual data for 10 components of the Portuguese 
government expenditures, as defined by the OECD, over the period 1990-2011. According 
to the classification of governments’ functions (COFOG), regarded by the OECD as the 
appropriate basis to examine the structure of government expenditure, there are ten 
components to be considered: general public services; defence; public order and safety; 
economic affairs, environmental protection, housing and community amenities; health; 
recreation, culture and religion; education; and social protection (see Table A.1 for more 
details). Although each component could be estimated separately as a time series, we 
opted to organize the components in a panel due to the data’s limited time span and to 
take advantage of the increased number of observations when testing. 
We employ the following empirical model to test opportunistic and partisan effects 
on the components of government expenditures: 
                                                 
2
Also at local level, Veiga and Pinho (2007) analyze the political determinants related to the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants and Veiga and Veiga (2007b) find that there is an electoral payoff to opportunistic 
investment expenditures. 
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tiiititit uCompDPolCompExpdCompExpd +++∆+=∆ − ηλγα .1   (2) 
where i=1,…,10, t=1991,…,2011. The dependent variable is the change in the respective 
expenditures component as percentage of the total expenditures;
3
 Compi is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for component i of the government expenditures and 
DPol controls for political cycles: when estimating opportunistic effects takes the value 1 
in the electoral year (and 0, otherwise), and when estimating partisan effects takes the 
value of 1 for left-wing governments (and 0, otherwise). As the sum of all shares of the 
components to the government total expenditures is equal to 1, one of the expenditure 
components has to be excluded from the regression analysis.
4
 
In dynamic estimations the fixed effects estimator is biased. The estimators that 
take into account that bias can be grouped into: the instrumental variables estimators; 
and bias-corrected estimators. According to the large sample properties of the GMM 
methods, the dynamic estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) will also be biased 
if employed to our specification given that we only have 10 individual-components in the 
dataset and a number of time periods significantly larger. Hence, a bias-corrected 
estimator is more appropriated here. Therefore, we apply Bruno’s (2005a, 2005b) bias-
corrected least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel data models with 
small N. The Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator is used as the initial estimator where the 
instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009), which avoids using invalid or 
                                                 
3
 All variables are defined in Table A.2 and the respective descriptive statistics can be found in Table A.3. The 
first difference of the dependent variable is used because the panel unit root tests are not clear regarding its 
stationarity in level. The Fisher unit root tests based on the Phillips-Perron tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis that “all panels contain unit roots” for the CompExpd variable, but reject it when its first 
difference is considered (see Table A.4 in Annex). Therefore, ∆CompExpd is used as dependent variable. 
4
This issue will be clarified below in the analysis of the empirical results. 
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too many instruments. We undertake 25 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the 
estimated standard errors.
5
 
 
4. Empirical results 
As the time span is relatively small, instead of the traditional time series analyses, a 
dynamic panel data model is employed to detect on which components Portuguese 
governments tend to act politically. We start by leaving the component “defence” out of 
the estimations and considering social protection as the baseline category for 
comparisons. Hence, all but one of the remaining nine multiplicative dummies are 
included in the model. The results are shown in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Our findings indicate that expenditures on general public services tend to increase 
in election years at the expenses of social protection; a similar effect is found for health 
expenditures, but expenditures in economic affairs present a substantial decrease in 
election years (see column 1 in Table 3). The other components of expenditures do not 
change significantly relatively to social protection. The results are very similar when we 
leave the dummy for environmental protection out instead of defence (see column 2). We 
also checked for partisan effects in the components of the expenditures (see column 3), 
but no relevant results were found.
6
 
Next, we explore whether the dynamics of those components is influenced or not 
by the elections and ideology (columns 4 and 5). The dependent variable is replaced by 
                                                 
5
The results do not qualitatively change with more repetitions (50, 100 or 200) or when the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator. Those results are available upon request. 
6
In this case, the variable DPol takes the value of 1 when a left-wing government is in office and 0 otherwise. 
 9 
the growth rate of the components (GrExpd).
7
 Regarding the election effects, we observe 
that the growth rate of expenditures on defence, public order and safety, economic affairs 
and housing, and community amenities decreases substantially during election years in 
comparison with social protection. The results seem to confirm for some cases the idea of 
increases in those expenditures that are related to items more immediately visible to 
voters. The findings on the partisan side remain weak: only housing and community 
amenities seem to present a higher growth rate in comparison to social protection when a 
left-wing party is in office. 
Concerning this evidence, we conclude that the opportunistic effects are much 
more relevant than the partisan effects when we focus our analysis on the components of 
public expenditures. The panel data framework used allows us to more clearly understand 
the potential electoral differences between the components, by enabling the construction 
of a matrix where the estimated impact of each component is compared with all the 
others. To construct that matrix we depart from regression 1 in Table 3, leaving outside 
one component at a time and considering different basis categories in order to collect all 
the possible effects between the ten expenditure components considered in this study. 
The results of that extensive analysis are reported in Table 4 and compare each 
component (first column) with the respective basis-category (in line). 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
The results present some interesting patterns. Noticeably, the biggest losers in 
election years are defence and economic affairs. While the results for the first were 
expected, we had no prior expectations regarding the second manly due to the mix 
between strong/weak signalling and short/long term characteristics found in the 
                                                 
7
 As here the sum of the growth rates do not adds up to 1 or 100%, we do not need to exclude any category 
from the estimations, but we keep social protection as the basis category. 
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aggregate’s composition. Expenditures on economic affairs seem to be penalized relatively 
to health, environmental protection, recreation, education and social protection. 
As to the components preferred in election years clearly public services and also 
health and social protection seem to stand out. In election years the percentage of general 
public services to the total of public expenditures increases when compared with all the 
other components, except with health. Expenditures on health also tend to increase in the 
election years relatively to defence, public order and safety, economic affairs and social 
protection. These components exhibit strong signalling characteristics and can provide 
electoral effects in the short-run. The results are in line with previous findings (see, for 
instance, Blais and Nadeau, 1992and Potrafke, 2010). Possibly one of the reasons for 
public services to be so highlighted in election years is because it includes general 
transfers between different levels of the governmental structure. Those transfers 
probably increase in order to conclude constructions or are used on other highly visible 
items. In fact, Veiga and Pinho (2007) found evidence that political factors exert an 
important role in the distribution process of intergovernmental grants at Portuguese local 
elections. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyse whether the components of public expenditures in 
Portugal exhibit politically driven cycles. The empirical analyses reveal that opportunist 
effects on the expenditure components are significantly more important than partisan 
effects. In general, the way Portuguese governments are found to “play” with expenditure 
components is consistent with previous studies and theoretical expectations. In particular, 
the results show that governments, independently of its ideology, usually choose to 
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increase those expenditure components that have more visibility and impact in terms of 
electoral return: general public services, social protection and health care. Therefore, we 
conclude that Portuguese governments tend to act opportunistically in election years by 
favouring those components that can provide them with the best chances of winning the 
elections. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Empirical results for the decomposition of the government expenditures 
  Elect Elect LeftGov  Elect LeftGov  
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  
         
∆CompExpd(-1)  0.106* 0.096 0.075     
  (0.065) (0.069) (0.059)     
GrExpd(-1)      0.159*** 0.159***  
      (0.044) (0.047)  
DPol*PublicServ  1.122*** 1.121*** 0.236  4.351 -1.728  
  (0.297) (0.297) (0.370)  (4.976) (6.222)  
DPol*Defence   -0.294   -10.096** -0.712  
   (0.327)   (4.083) (4.953)  
DPol*PublicOrder  -0.322 -0.321 0.252  -8.729* 4.204  
  (0.321) (0.397) (0.393)  (4.844) (4.036)  
DPol*EconAffairs  -1.000*** -0.998*** 0.053  -10.874** -2.067  
  (0.390) (0.362) (0.313)  (4.287) (5.716)  
DPol*Environment  0.048  -0.017  3.698 -4.880  
  (0.357)  (0.416)  (4.826) (4.433)  
DPol*Amenities  -0.237 -0.238 0.295  -13.315** 14.570**  
  (0.364) (0.371) (0.513)  (5.435) (7.039)  
DPol*Health  0.510* 0.504* -0.494  2.726 -6.079  
  (0.298) (0.303) (0.476)  (3.861) (5.411)  
DPol*Recreation  0.164 0.163 0.027  5.181 -1.780  
  (0.340) (0.345) (0.376)  (5.342) (5.122)  
DPol*Education  0.047 0.047 0.010  -1.443 -1.869  
  (0.379) (0.386) (0.410)  (5.381) (4.287)  
         
         
No. Obs.  180 180 180  210 210  
Notes: Standard-errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. ∆ is the first difference operator. A bias-corrected least squares dummy variable 
estimator for dynamic panel data models is employed. The Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator is used as the 
initial estimator. We undertake 25 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. 
The results do not qualitatively change with more repetitions (50, 100 or 200) or when the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator. 
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Table 2. Election effects on the composition of government expenditures 
 PublicServ Defence PublicOrder EconAffairs Environment Amenities Health Recreation Education SocialProtect 
           
PublicServ -- 1.414*** 1.443*** 2.122*** 1.073** 1.359*** 0.611 0.957** 1.074** 1.122*** 
 -- (0.434) (0.428) (0.487) (0.452) (0.407) (0.426) (0.416) (0.542) (0.297) 
Defence -1.414*** -- 0.028 0.704 -0.342 -0.056 -0.798* -0.457 -0.341 -0.294 
 (0.434) -- (0.491) (0.491) (0.529) (0.531) (0.425) (0.557) (0.521) (0.327) 
PublicOrder -1.443*** -0.028 -- 0.679 -0.370 -0.085 -0.832** -0.486 -0.369 -0.322 
 (0.428) (0.491) -- (0.485) (0.437) (0.523) (0.416) (0.548) (0.510) (0.321) 
EconAffairs -2.122*** -0.704 -0.679 -- -1.049* -0.763 -1.511*** -1.165* -1.048* -1.000*** 
 (0.487) (0.448) (0.485) -- (0.612) (0.560) (0.421) (0.607) (0.514) (0.390) 
Environment -1.073** 0.342 0.370 1.049* -- 0.285 0.462 -0.116 0.001 0.048 
 (0.452) (0.529) (0.437) (0.612) -- (0.536) (0.521) (0.487) (0.546) (0.357) 
Amenities -1.359*** 0.056 0.085 0.763 -0.285 -- -0.747 -0.401 -0.284 -0.237 
 (0.407) (0.531) (0.523) (0.560) (0.536) -- (0.556) (0.379) (0.599) (0.365) 
Health -0.611 0.798* 0.832** 1.511*** 0.462 0.747 -- 0.346 0.463 0.511* 
 (0.426) (0.425) (0.416) (0.421) (0.521) (0.556) -- (0.490) (0.395) (0.298) 
Recreation -0.957** 0.457 0.486 1.165* 0.116 0.401 -0.346 -- 0.117 0.164 
 (0.416) (0.557) (0.548) (0.607) (0.487) (0.379) (0.490) -- (0.484) (0.340) 
Education -1.074** 0.341 0.369 1.048** -0.001 0.284 -0.463 -0.117 -- 0.047 
 (0.542) (0.521) (0.510) (0.514) (0.546) (0.599) (0.395) (0.484) -- (0.379) 
SocialProtect -1.122*** 0.294 0.322 1.000*** -0.048 0.237 -0.511* -0.164 -0.047 -- 
 (0.297) (0.327) (0.321) (0.390) (0.357) (0.365) (0.298) (0.340) (0.379) -- 
           
 
 
  16 
Annex 
 
 
Table A.1 – The components of the government total expenditures 
General public services (PublicServ) 
Executive and legislative organs; financial and fiscal affairs; external affairs; Foreign economic aid; General services; Basic 
research; R&D general public services; Public debt transactions; Transfers of a general character between different levels 
of government; other General public services. 
Defence (Defence) 
Military defence; Civil defence; Foreign military aid; R&D defence; other Defence expenditures. 
Public order and safety (PublicOrder) 
Police and Fire-protection; Law courts; Prisons; R&D public order and safety; other Public order and safety expenditures. 
Economic affairs (EconAffairs) 
General economic, commercial and labour affairs; Agriculture; forestry; fishing and hunting;Fuel and energy; Mining; 
manufacturing and construction; Transport; Communication; R&D economic affairs and other expenditures. 
Environmental protection (Environment) 
Waste management; Waste water management; Pollution abatement; Protection of biodiversity and landscape; R&D 
environmental protection; other Environmental protection expenditures. 
Housing and community amenities (Amenities) 
Housing development; Community development; Water supply; Street lighting; R&D housing and community amenities; 
other Housing and community amenities expenditures. 
Health (Health) 
Medical products, appliances and equipment; Outpatient services; Hospital services; Public health services; R&D health; 
other Health expenditures. 
Recreation, culture and religion (Recreation) 
Recreational and sporting services; Cultural services; Broadcasting and publishing services; Religious and other 
community services; R&D recreation, culture and religion; other Recreation, culture and religion expenditures. 
Education (Education) 
All education expenditures; Subsidiary services to education; R&D education; other Education expenditures. 
Social protection (SocialProtect) 
Sickness and disability; Old age; Survivors; Family and children; Unemployment; Housing; Social exclusion; R&D social 
protection; other Social protection expenditures. 
Source: OECD (2009), Government at a Glance. 
 
 
Table A.2 – Definition of the variables 
  
CompExpd Government expenditures by component as percentage of the government total expenditures. The 
components of the total expenditures are specified in Table A.2.  
GrExpd Growth rate of government expenditure by component, in percentage. 
DPol Dummy for the political variables; it can either take the value of 1 for the electoral year (and 0, 
otherwise) or the value of 1 for left-wing governments (and 0, otherwise). 
Sources: OECD Statistics from Government at a Glance. 
 
 
Table A.3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
      
CompExpd 220 10.00 8.943 0.843 36.72 
GrExpd 210 6.067 11.06 -47.59 43.59 
DPol (Elect=1) 220 0.318 0.467 0.000 1.000 
DPol (LeftGov=1) 220 0.591 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Sources: See Tables A.1 and A.2. 
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Table A.4 – Unit root tests 
   
        
 LLC IPS Fisher-ADF Fisher-PP 
   Inv.χ2 Inv.N Inv.L M.Inv.χ2 Inv.χ2 Inv.N Inv.L M.Inv.χ2 
CompExpd -2.757 -0.762 62.79 -5.098 -5.334 6.765 19.72 -0.238 -0.246 -0.045 
 [0.003] [0.223] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.476] [0.406] [0.403] [0.518] 
∆CompExpd -4.542 -4.999 110.9 -8.177 -9.738 14.38 163.0 -10.59 -14.33 22.61 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
GrExpd -3.921 -4.600 106.1 -7.942 -9.304 13.61 115.0 -8.312 -10.06 15.02 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
           
Notes: For sources, see Tables A.1 and A.2. ∆ is the first difference operator. For each test, we report the 
respective statistic and p-value (in square brackets). The Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) unit 
root tests are performed over the panel with constant and one lag; the null hypothesis is that “all panels 
contain unit-roots”. The LLC test assumes that all panels have the same autocorrelation coefficient, but the 
IPS test relaxes that assumption and allows each panel to have its own autocorrelation coefficient. The 
Fisher-type unit-root tests are based on augmented Dickey-Fuller (Fisher-ADF) tests and Phillips-Perron 
(Fisher-PP) tests with drift and one lag in all regressions; the null hypothesis is that “all panels contain unit-
roots”; these tests are conducted for each panel individually before combining the p-values from those tests 
to produce the overall test; the statistics and respective p-values (in square brackets) are reported for each 
type of Fisher test: inverse chi-squared, inverse normal, inverse logit and modified inverse chi-squared. 
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